Chapter 1 - II. The Definition of War, and the Original of the Word (Bellum)
Reactions to the Passage
1. Being then to treat of the Right of War, we must consider what that ‘War’ is which we are to treat of, and what the ‘Right’ is which we search for. Cicero defines War ‘a Dispute by force.’ But Custom has so prevailed, that not the Act of Hostility but the State and Situation of the contending Parties, now by that Name; so that War is the State or Situation of those (considered in that Respect) who dispute by Force of Arms. Which general Acceptation of the Word comprehends all the kinds of War of which we shall hereafter treat, not even excluding single Combats, which being really ancienter than Publick Wars, and undoubtably of the same Nature, may therefore well have one and the same Name. This agrees very well with the Etymology of the Word; for the Latin ‘Bellum’ (War) comes from the old Word ‘Duellum’ (a Duel) as ‘Bonus’ from ‘Duonus’, and ‘Bis’ from ‘Duis’. Now ‘Duellum’ was derived from ‘Duo’, and thereby implied a Difference between ‘two’ Persons, in the same Sense as we term Peace ‘Unity’ (from ‘Unitas’) for a contrary Reason. So the Greek Word ‘πόλεμος’ (pólemos), commonly used to signify ‘War,’ expresses in its Original an Idea of Multitude. The ancient ‘Greeks’ likewise called it ‘Λύη’, which imports a ‘Disunion’ of Minds; just as by the Term ‘Δύη’, they meant the ‘Dissolution’ of the Parts of the Body.
2. Neither does the Use of the Word (‘War’) contradict this larger Acceptation. For tho’ sometimes we only apply it to signify a Publick Quarrel, this is no Objection at all, since ‘tis certain, that the more eminent ‘Species’ does often peculiarly assume the Name of its ‘Genus’. We do not include ‘Justice’ in the Definition of War, because it is the Design of this Treatise to examine, whether any War be just, and what War may be so called. But we must distinguish that which is in Question, from that ‘concerning’ which the Question proposed.
In reading over this first part of section two, the emphasis is on contention between two parties rather than solely a dispute by force itself. In pulling in the word pólemos, Grotius further places emphasis on the role of the ‘multitude’ or many. To Grotius, then, War seems to equally be about the role difference and contention between the involved parties to the degree of being a recognized situation, which must include many individuals on the side of each, in order for ‘War’ to occur. Scale seems to be important with this discussion of war as well.
The second part of section two is important to the degree that Grotius is laying out the goals of the rest of his treatise. Here he makes a distinction between ‘justice’ and ‘war’, and that he seeks in his examination to determine what war is separately from if a war (any war) can be just.
In reading over these sections again, and not having read these volumes before nor looked too in-depth into the table of contents, I wonder if Grotius might pursue ‘justice’ not solely in an all-or-nothing manner regarding a specific war. Conceivably there might be different kinds of ‘justice’ in war, both in starting and in ending, as well as at different levels of the conduct of war itself. Can a war that is determined from the start to be ‘unjust’ end in a manner that could be considered ‘just’? Might the many acts of ‘justice’ at the individual level of combatants still spiral into ‘unjust’ actions or activities? Moreover, can a war be considered ‘just’ in one period of time, only to lose this determination over time or across different states?
These are a few of the questions that come to my mind on this second reading in my examination of these volumes written by Grotius. I don’t have any answers, and it is possible Grotius has not engaged in a way that will shed some light on them. Still, I can hope the chapters ahead will provide some insight into my questions regarding ‘degrees of justice’ in ‘war’ going forward.