“All the Differences of those who do not acknowledge one common Civil Right, whereby they may and ought to be decided; such as are a multitude of People that form no Community, or those that are Members of different Nations, whether private Persons, or Kings, or other Powers invested with an Authority equal to that of Kings, as the Nobles of a State, or the Body of the People, in Republican Governments: All such Differences, I say, relate either to the Affairs of War, or Peace. But because War is undertaken for the Sake of Peace, and there is no Controversy from whence War may not arise, all such Quarrels, as commonly happen, will properly be treated under the Head of the Right of War; and then War itself will lead us to Peace, as to its End and Purpose.” - pages 133-134.
There are three main points that I take away from this first passage of the first chapter in Grotius’ work. Line 1 through the start of line 6 asserts that it is the fact that not all peoples and persons are under the authority of a single polity, nor all the same underneath the polity they are a part of, that leads to interactions that Grotius broadly places under affairs of war or affairs of peace. Differences between people, and the interactions that follow, are what give rise to a need for regulation over and between them by the polity in order to maintain itself. Disputes within and between polities is what leads to war, while the absence or settlement of disputes is what maintains peace.
Lines 6 through 8 are interesting in that it presents Grotius’ belief on why wars are undertaken (“for the Sake of Peace”) and how any and all controversies can contribute to war. I somewhat disagree with the first part of this, that wars are undertaken for the sake of peace. I think it would be more appropriate to say that wars are undertaken “for the Sake of a favorable Peace.” If Peace, any kind of Peace, was the goal, than any state not at war with another would exert as much effort as possible to see that war did not break out. If states cared about what kind of Peace, however, they would engage in War with an eye towards attaining specific outcomes for the Peace to follow. They would seize territory to improve their security, to in turn prevent the outbreak of unfavorable wars in the future. They would act first to destroy the ability of an opposing state to make war before they themselves face an unfavorable war with that opposing state. They would seek concessions following the conduct of a way to enrich and secure themselves against potential enemies in the future. In sum, states wage War to secure a more favorable Peace for themselves.
Lines 8 to 9 present War will lead to Peace as the “End and Purpose.” Similar to the previous point, I think this does not take into account the importance of the favorability of the outcomes of war. Building off of this passage, I would say that Wars are waged by states in particular to attain outcomes that favor themselves in the Peace to follow. If these outcomes are not obtained, the state that launched the war might well attempt to wage another war in the future to obtain them. Conversely, should a state lose something in a war, they will be motivated to pursue a war themselves when better positions in the future to reclaim what was theres. Viewed in this way, war may well beget peace in the short-term, but in the medium to long-term it might well lead to more war.
For example, take the conflicts engaged in by Russia under Putin. Since coming to power in Russia following Yeltsin, Putin has deployed his country’s military into a number of conflicts against other states in Europe and beyond. The Second Chechen War (1999-2009), the Russo-Georgian War (2008), and the Russo-Ukrainian War (2014-present), all were wars waged by Russia against states (or de-facto state in the case of Chechnya). Each of these, barring the most recent, led to outcomes that satisfied Putin’s desires for the shape of the subsequent peace. Yet, in attaining these goals, Putin has also opened the door to future wars in initiated by the losers of these wars, should they ever gain the opportunity to wage one in which they have reasonable expectations for achieving their desired outcomes for the peace to follow. Chechnya might well seek independence again in the future. Georgia might act to reacquire Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If the latest conflict continues to go badly for Russia, Ukraine might seek the return of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk. The point is, each of these initial outcomes contributed to new tensions and grievances against Russia, which serve as motivations for future conflicts. The end to War requires both victors and vanquished, which means the Peace that follows will not be favorable to all. The End and Purpose of War might be Peace, but it is a favorable Peace that is sought, and as this cannot be attained by all parties in War this will likely lead to more War in future.
Here ends my first reaction to the work of Grotius in “The Rights of War and Peace” and I hope you enjoyed it. I can already tell these three volumes are going to make for interesting reading. See you next time!
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